A US Air Force F-35 fighter jet arrives at the International Aerospace Exhibition ILA at Schoenefeld Airport in Schoenefeld, south of Berlin, Germany, June 9, 2026.
The disagreement culminated in July 2019 when Turkey was formally removed from the F-35 programme, during Trump’s first term in the White House.
The US president also signalled that he was open to reconsidering the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft that had remained blocked for years.
Even before Washington has taken any formal decision on transferring F-35 fighter jets to Turkey, the proposal has generated significant resistance from one of America’s closest allies.
The discussion was expected to include the possible sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey.
The possibility of Turkey rejoining the United States-led F-35 fighter jet programme is one of the biggest outcomes of the Nato Summit held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026.
During the summit, US President Donald Trump announced that Washington would begin lifting sanctions imposed on Turkey under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
He also indicated that his administration was willing to consider allowing Turkey to acquire the fifth-generation F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft, although he later clarified that he had not reached a final decision on the matter.
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The announcement marked a dramatic u-turn from the policy adopted after Turkey purchased the Russian-made S-400 air defence system in 2019 — a decision that led to Ankara’s removal from the F-35 programme and triggered American sanctions the following year.
How did relations between Washington and Ankara get here?
Turkey was not merely another customer for the F-35 Lightning II programme. It was one of the original international production partners involved in developing the fifth-generation fighter, with plans to induct more than 100 aircraft into its air force.
Turkish defence companies were integrated into the aircraft’s global manufacturing supply chain, making Ankara an important stakeholder in one of the world’s most sophisticated military aviation projects.
That relationship changed dramatically in 2019.
Turkey decided to purchase and deploy the Russian-made S-400 Triumf air defence system despite repeated objections from Washington and other Nato allies. The United States maintained that operating one of Russia’s most advanced radar systems alongside the F-35 posed an unacceptable security risk.
American defence officials argued that the S-400’s sophisticated radar could potentially gather valuable information about the F-35’s stealth profile, radar cross-section and electronic signatures.
A US Air Force F-35 fighter jet arrives at the International Aerospace Exhibition ILA at Schoenefeld Airport in Schoenefeld, south of Berlin, Germany, June 9, 2026. File Image/Reuters
Such information, they warned, could eventually find its way to Moscow, undermining one of the fighter jet’s most important military advantages.
The disagreement culminated in July 2019 when Turkey was formally removed from the F-35 programme, during Trump’s first term in the White House. The fallout did not end there.
In December 2020, Washington imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), targeting Turkey’s Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB).
Those measures restricted export licences for American defence equipment and froze the assets of senior Turkish defence procurement officials, effectively shutting down several channels of military cooperation between the two allies.
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For years, the sanctions became a defining feature of US-Turkey relations. Ankara repeatedly argued that the restrictions were unfair and continued to defend its decision to acquire the S-400 system.
That impasse remained largely unchanged for nearly six years.
Why is the US changing its approach now?
Trump arrived in Turkey for the alliance’s annual gathering at a time when Nato faces multiple strategic challenges, including European rearmament, continued tensions with Russia and broader instability across West Asia.
For Turkish diplomats, one of the immediate priorities before the summit was reportedly ensuring that Trump would actually attend the meeting.
Although the American president has attended every Nato summit since returning to office, he has consistently criticised alliance members for failing to contribute enough towards collective defence spending.
This year, however, Trump openly acknowledged that Turkey's role as host influenced his decision to attend. That statement alone was widely viewed as an important diplomatic success for Ankara.
The summit soon became an opportunity for both leaders to showcase a visibly improved relationship.
Trump was welcomed personally by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the airport on July 7. Turkey also inaugurated a new airport terminal bearing the American president’s name, while fighter aircraft performed an aerial display leaving red, white and blue trails across the Ankara skyline.
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The ceremonial reception continued at Turkey’s presidential palace.
Trump was escorted by 100 horsemen before being received by ceremonial guards. In a first for the presidential complex, some members of the honour guard appeared dressed as historical Ottoman soldiers.
Throughout the summit, the two leaders projected warmth rarely seen during the previous phase of bilateral relations.
Erdogan repeatedly referred to Trump as a close friend. “It was valuable that Trump emphasised the importance he places on myself and our friendship,” Erdogan said as the summit closed. “I thank my dear friend once again.”
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomes US President Donald Trump, who is paying an official visit to Turkey for the 36th Nato Heads of State and Government Summit, at Ankara Airport in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7, 2026. File Image/Pool via Reuters
Trump likewise spoke positively about Erdogan on multiple occasions during the summit, with the two leaders sharing smiles, handshakes and embraces while communicating through interpreters.
Under US President Joe Biden, the relationship had remained distant, with Washington expressing concerns over democratic freedoms and human rights inside Turkey. Since Trump’s return to the White House last year, the tone has changed considerably.
Turkey’s growing defence industry, its military capabilities and its strategic location on Nato’s southeastern flank have also contributed to a renewed appreciation of Ankara’s importance within the alliance.
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As European Nato members continue expanding their military preparedness in response to Russia, Turkey possesses the alliance’s second-largest standing army and an increasingly capable domestic defence industrial base.
At the same time, Ankara has sought to position itself as a diplomatic intermediary capable of maintaining communication with multiple regional powers.
According to reports, Turkey has acted as an important channel between Western governments, Russia and Iran. Following the escalation of US-led tensions with Iran earlier this year, Ankara worked alongside Riyadh and Cairo to help preserve communication channels between opposing sides.
Does lifting sanctions automatically mean Turkey gets the F-35?
Despite the optimism displayed during the summit, the answer is considerably more complicated.
During a meeting attended by reporters, Erdogan responded positively when Trump indicated that he intended to lift the sanctions.
The US president also signalled that he was open to reconsidering the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft that had remained blocked for years. Later, however, Trump clarified that he had not yet made a final decision regarding the aircraft.
That distinction is important because the sanctions and the aircraft programme are governed by separate legal frameworks.
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The CAATSA sanctions primarily target Turkey’s defence procurement agency, restricting export licences and imposing financial penalties on senior officials connected to defence acquisitions.
Rolling back those sanctions would reopen more conventional defence trade between the United States and Turkey. However, the F-35 issue is governed by an additional legal restriction.
Section 1245 of the US National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the transfer of F-35 aircraft unless the United States certifies that Turkey no longer possesses the Russian S-400 missile defence system.
So in practice, lifting sanctions alone does not automatically authorise aircraft deliveries. The legal requirement concerning the S-400 remains in force.
One proposal currently being discussed involves relocating Turkey’s S-400 batteries to a neutral third country. Such an arrangement could potentially satisfy American legal requirements without requiring Turkey to completely abandon its investment in the Russian system.
Even that option, however, presents significant complications.
Russia’s original agreement with Turkey includes end-user obligations governing the transfer of the equipment. Any attempt to move the S-400 to another country could therefore encounter resistance from Moscow or trigger contractual disputes.
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The issue is expected to be put under the lens within the United States as well.
Although Trump’s administration may seek to revive defence cooperation with Turkey, the proposal is likely to encounter resistance in Congress, where lawmakers have consistently linked Turkey’s access to the F-35 programme with the complete removal of the S-400 system.
Why is Israel strongly opposed to the proposed F-35 sale?
Even before Washington has taken any formal decision on transferring F-35 fighter jets to Turkey, the proposal has generated significant resistance from one of America’s closest allies.
The prospect of Ankara eventually operating fifth-generation American stealth fighters has become a sensitive issue because of the increasingly strained relationship between Turkey and Israel in recent years.
Turkey, despite being a Nato member, has repeatedly criticised Israeli military operations in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Ankara has also accused Israel of attempting to undermine the recent US-Iran ceasefire agreement.
Against this backdrop, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu publicly urged Washington not to proceed with the proposed aircraft sale.
In an interview with CNN during the Nato summit, Netanyahu made it clear that he had already conveyed his objections directly to Trump. “It would destroy the power balance in the Middle East because Turkey has aggressive aspirations,” Netanyahu said.
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His remarks highlighted Israel’s concern that supplying advanced stealth aircraft to Turkey could alter the military equilibrium in the region.
According to Reuters, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth even cancelled a meeting that had been scheduled for Wednesday, July 8, with Netanyahu. The discussion was expected to include the possible sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey.
An Israeli source, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, also told Reuters that Hegseth had been due to meet Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz during his visit to Israel, with Iran expected to feature prominently in those discussions.
Interestingly, Trump did not distance himself from Ankara during the summit.
While seated alongside Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte, Trump defended Erdogan against criticism coming from Netanyahu, reinforcing the impression that the White House currently views Turkey as an increasingly important strategic partner despite objections from Israel.
Why should India be paying close attention?
The issue is significant not because Turkey has already received the aircraft — it has not — but because the proposed policy shift intersects with three areas that directly affect India’s strategic interests.
The CAATSA precedent & India’s own S-400 acquisition
India is itself an operator of the Russian-made S-400 Triumf air defence system. When New Delhi proceeded with its purchase from Moscow, questions arose regarding the possible application of CAATSA sanctions.
India ultimately secured a rare waiver from the US Congress during the first Biden administration, allowing the acquisition to proceed without the punitive measures imposed on some other countries.
Turkey’s latest experience offers another illustration of how US priorities can influence the implementation of sanctions. For nearly six years, Ankara remained under CAATSA restrictions because of its S-400 purchase.
Now, Washington has indicated that those sanctions will begin to be lifted.
Although Turkey’s circumstances differ from India’s, the broader message observed by Indian strategic planners is that American sanctions policy is capable of changing significantly when larger considerations come into play.
Turkey’s defence partnership with Pakistan
Perhaps the most immediate concern for India relates to Ankara’s expanding military cooperation with Islamabad. Over recent years, Turkey has emerged as one of Pakistan’s most significant defence partners.
Turkey has been working with Pakistan on the MILGEM warship programme while also supplying sophisticated defence equipment and electronic systems. Military cooperation between the two countries has steadily deepened through joint exercises, defence production projects and operational coordination.
That relationship came into the spotlight during Operation Sindoor in May last year, India’s military response following the Pahalgam massacre.
During that time, Turkey reportedly provided direct tactical assistance to Pakistan during the operation, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and military operatives to strengthen Islamabad’s military posture.
Against that backdrop, any improvement in Turkey’s access to advanced American military technology naturally attracts attention in New Delhi.
Even if the United States explicitly prohibits Turkey from transferring F-35 aircraft, associated hardware or classified technologies to Pakistan, Indian defence planners remain focused on the indirect benefits that could emerge through military cooperation.
The concern is not about the physical transfer of aircraft. Rather, it centres on operational knowledge.
If Turkish Air Force personnel eventually operate fifth-generation stealth aircraft or gain access to advanced technologies associated with the programme, they would inevitably accumulate practical experience relating to stealth operations, electronic warfare, sensor integration and combat doctrine.
That expertise could become relevant during combined military activities with Pakistan. The Pakistan Air Force and the Turkish Air Force regularly participate together in major exercises, including Anatolia Eagle.
Joint training has long formed an important element of defence cooperation between the two countries.
Should Turkish pilots eventually operate fifth-generation aircraft — or utilise technologies developed for Turkey's indigenous KAAN fighter programme using advanced American powerplants — the shared operational experience could assist Pakistan in understanding how modern stealth aircraft are employed during combat missions.
Exposure to fifth-generation operational concepts could help Pakistani planners refine counter-stealth tactics and improve their understanding of advanced air combat. For India, which continues modernising its own air force, that possibility carries strategic significance.
The importance of India’s indigenous fighter programme
The developments only reinforce the importance of India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme.
Successive changes in international defence relationships have demonstrated that access to advanced military technologies can be influenced again and again. For New Delhi, the broader lesson is the importance of reducing long-term dependence on external suppliers wherever possible.
Accelerating indigenous fifth-generation fighter development provides greater certainty than relying exclusively on international procurement decisions that may change with shifting political circumstances.
India’s strategic interests across West Asia.
India has deeply invested in the economic and security architecture of West Asia via the I2U2 Group (India, Israel, UAE, USA) and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
A significant rupture between Washington and Jerusalem over Turkish re-armament disrupts the stable, integrated West Asia that India requires for its trade security, energy transit corridors and long-term connectivity projects.
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With inputs from agencies
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