Top-ranking security officials, however, caution that the forces need to stay alert as the situation on the ground remains complex.
The number of security forces killed has also declined – from a peak of 94 in 2018 to just one this year.
“But from the perspective of a security officer, the challenge remains.”On Wednesday, Zakir Ahmad Ganaie, a Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist, was killed in a gunfight in south Kashmir’s Shopian.
But the number of Pakistani operatives, security officials say, hovers around 30.
The insurgency has become more opaque, harder to penetrate, and harder to track.”Security officials also emphasised that the “Burhan model” was an aberration rather than a sustainable template for insurgency.
On July 1, 2015, a picture of 11 Kashmiri youth, dressed in camouflage, carrying Kalashnikov rifles and posing in a forest, appeared on Facebook. At the centre was Burhan-ud-din Wani, who, shedding anonymity, broke from others like him, choosing to broadcast himself and his group on social media and deciding to move through the Valley’s urban areas, particularly south Kashmir.
The images would influence several educated, tech-savvy young men from well-to-do families, opening a new chapter in Kashmir’s fight against insurgency and leading to a crisis not seen since the 1990s.
Exactly 10 years after Burhan Wani’s killing in a military operation in south Kashmir’s Kokernag, that landscape has shifted once more, with every key indicator – from the number of active terrorists to fresh local recruitments for attacks and killings – witnessing a sharp decline. Top-ranking security officials, however, caution that the forces need to stay alert as the situation on the ground remains complex.
On July 1, 2015, a picture of 11 Kashmiri youth, dressed in camouflage, carrying Kalashnikov rifles and posing in a forest, appeared on Facebook. (File Photo) On July 1, 2015, a picture of 11 Kashmiri youth, dressed in camouflage, carrying Kalashnikov rifles and posing in a forest, appeared on Facebook. (File Photo)
The numbers are indisputable: In 2016, the year after the photos first emerged, 157 terror operatives were killed in Kashmir. This number peaked at 266 in 2018 and saw another uptick to 230 in 2020. But since then, terrorist killings have steadily decreased, with just 10 recorded so far this year. The number of security forces killed has also declined – from a peak of 94 in 2018 to just one this year. The same goes for civilians – from 88 deaths in 2018 to just one this year.
“As a civilian, you see peace, the dividends of peace – the attacks have declined, killings have fallen, and the number of arrests and FIRs have come down,” said a key anti-insurgency police officer. “But from the perspective of a security officer, the challenge remains.”
On Wednesday, Zakir Ahmad Ganaie, a Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist, was killed in a gunfight in south Kashmir’s Shopian. He was believed to be one of only two active local terrorists, apart from one Latief, operating in Kashmir. But the number of Pakistani operatives, security officials say, hovers around 30.
The shift – online and offline
Officials say the insurgency landscape has shifted from towns and cities to the dense, mountainous forests of the Valley. On social media, the focus is back on anonymity, with communication sparse and an emphasis on leaving little or no footprint.
Story continues below this ad
“Even though a large number of operations were always based on HUMINT (human intelligence), the TECHINT (technological intelligence) helped corroborate and pinpoint locations with more precision,” said a senior police officer. “It also helped us understand the evolving dynamics of insurgency and how they operate, communicate and what they were up to.”
Less online chatter has meant security forces have TECHINT to rely on, the officer said.
“As security or intelligence officers, we see the overall security situation has improved, but it has brought a new set of challenges,” said the officer. “There may be fewer terrorists left, but they have gone silent. The insurgency has become more opaque, harder to penetrate, and harder to track.”
Security officials also emphasised that the “Burhan model” was an aberration rather than a sustainable template for insurgency. “He may have used social media to lure a large number of youth, but look at the rate at which they were killed,” said another police officer involved in anti-insurgency operations. “It took them four years to realise that it is unsustainable.”
Story continues below this ad
Security officials said a key shift has been the takeover of “command and control” by Pakistani operatives. “After 2019, the Hizb (Hizbul Mujahideen) was almost wiped out, and Lashkar took the centrestage. They are highly trained, resilient and well-equipped. They operate from areas with a tactical advantage, such as high-altitude jungles. The command and control has increasingly shifted to these Pakistani operatives of Lashkar,” the police officer said.
