The Court further directed de-indexing, delinking and masking of judicial records in several cases involving acquittals, matrimonial disputes, quashed proceedings, settlements and other private disputes.
The Court further observed that privacy in the digital age extends beyond physical seclusion and includes informational autonomy and informational self-determination.
The Court clarified that constitutional courts are nevertheless empowered to enforce the right as a facet of Article 21.
The Court further explained that what is sought to be moderated is not preservation of judicial records, but unrestricted name-based discoverability through internet search engines.
The Court observed: “The judgment or order continues to exist on the court's website, on Indian Kanoon, or on whichever platform hosts it.
The Delhi High Court has held that the “right to be forgotten”, understood as the right of an individual to seek removal or restriction of personal information from public digital accessibility where such information no longer serves any legitimate public purpose, flows from the constitutional guarantee of informational privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court further directed de-indexing, delinking and masking of judicial records in several cases involving acquittals, matrimonial disputes, quashed proceedings, settlements and other private disputes.
The Court was hearing a batch of petitions seeking de-indexing of judicial records, removal of name-based search accessibility, masking of personal identifiers and delinking of online content relating to criminal proceedings, matrimonial disputes, acquittals, settlements and private civil disputes.
The petitioners contended that continued digital accessibility of such records caused disproportionate and continuing harm to their dignity, privacy, reputation and life prospects.
A Bench of Justice Sachin Datta observed: “The right to be forgotten, understood as subsuming the right of an individual to seek removal or restriction of personal information from public digital accessibility, where such information is no longer relevant or serves no legitimate public purpose, flows naturally and necessarily from the constitutional recognition of informational privacy under Article 21.”
The Bench further observed: “The right to be forgotten thus reflects the evolution of privacy in response to the permanence of online information. In a society where digital records are virtually indelible, the ability to seek erasure ensures that informational self-determination remains effective.”
Senior Advocates Akhil Sibal, Arvind Nigam and Trideep Pais represented the petitioners, while Senior Advocates Saurabh Seth and Ajit Warrier, along with CGSCs and Standing Counsels, appeared on behalf of the respondents.
Background
The batch of petitions before the Delhi High Court arose from varied factual backgrounds, including acquittals in criminal cases, matrimonial disputes, quashed FIRs, settled proceedings, discharged accused persons, victims of sexual offences and individuals whose names appeared incidentally in judicial records despite not being parties to proceedings.
Several petitioners contended that though proceedings against them had either culminated in acquittal, discharge, quashing or settlement, judicial records and related reportage continued to remain publicly accessible through name-based internet searches, thereby causing continuing prejudice to their dignity, social standing, marriage prospects, business interests and professional reputation.
The petitions sought various forms of relief, including de-indexing from search engines, delinking from search results, masking of names and personal identifiers from publicly accessible judicial records, removal of URLs and restriction of name-based search functionality on intermediary platforms such as Google and Indian Kanoon.
The Court noted that the petitions raised questions situated at the intersection of constitutional law, privacy rights and the digital permanence of online information, particularly concerning the balance between informational privacy and the principle of open justice.
Court’s Observation
The High Court extensively examined the constitutional basis of informational privacy and traced the evolution of the right to be forgotten as a natural extension of the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court further observed that privacy in the digital age extends beyond physical seclusion and includes informational autonomy and informational self-determination.
The Court noted: “Information self-determination means the control over one's personal information, the individual's right to decide which information about themselves will be disclosed, to whom and for what purpose.”
The Bench observed that the concept of privacy in the digital age concerns not merely secrecy or isolation, but active control over the dissemination and accessibility of personal information in an era where digital records possess near-permanent visibility.
The Court further held: It protects individuals from perpetual exposure to past events that may no longer bear relevance, while preserving their dignity and autonomy in society.”
The High Court also addressed the absence of dedicated legislation governing the right to be forgotten in India. The Court clarified that constitutional courts are nevertheless empowered to enforce the right as a facet of Article 21.
In this regard, the Bench observed: “India presently lacks a comprehensive statutory framework explicitly governing the right to be forgotten. However, the absence of specific legislation does not preclude Constitutional Courts from recognising and enforcing this right.”
The High Court extensively dealt with the doctrine of open justice and examined whether recognition of the right to be forgotten would conflict with transparency and public accessibility of judicial proceedings.
The Court observed that the principle of open justice undoubtedly requires judicial proceedings and records to remain publicly accessible to preserve institutional accountability, transparency and public confidence in the justice delivery system. However, the Bench clarified that open justice cannot be conflated with unrestricted and perpetual digital amplification of personal information through modern search technologies.
The Court further explained that what is sought to be moderated is not preservation of judicial records, but unrestricted name-based discoverability through internet search engines.
The Bench observed: “The record is preserved in its entirety for institutional, precedential and accountability purposes. What changes is only that the concerned name (whether an individual or an entity) ceases to function as an unlimited retrieval key that instantly and effortlessly surfaces the record for any casual internet user who happens to search that name.”
The High Court also clarified that judicial records would continue to remain fully accessible through case numbers, citations, court details and other purposeful identifiers even after de-indexing or masking.
The Court observed: “The judgment or order continues to exist on the court's website, on Indian Kanoon, or on whichever platform hosts it. It remains accessible to anyone who knows the case number, the citation, the court, or any other purposeful identifier.”
Referring to Hurbain v. Belgium (Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights, Application No. 57292/16), the Court held that de-indexing constitutes the least restrictive and most proportionate mechanism to balance privacy rights with institutional transparency.
The Court observed: “The minimal, appropriate measure is not erasure of the article which remained preserved in the archives, but its de-indexing from search engines so as to moderate accessibility.”
The Court further emphasised that the purpose of de-indexing is merely to restrict indiscriminate name-based retrieval by casual internet searches. The Bench observed: “The record is preserved in its entirety for institutional, precedential and accountability purposes. What changes is only that the concerned name ceases to function as an unlimited retrieval key that instantly and effortlessly surfaces the record for any casual internet user who happens to search that name.”
The Court also elaborated upon the concept of masking and explained that masking involves the substitution of names and personal identifiers in publicly accessible digital records with neutral references such as “ABC” or “XYZ”, while preserving complete unredacted records within judicial archives.
In this regard, the Court observed: “Masking, in the context of the present proceedings, refers to the replacement of a party’s name and such other personal identifiers (including address and identity details) as are necessary, with a neutral reference such as ‘ABC’ or ‘XYZ’ in the publicly accessible digital version of a judicial record.”
The High Court further clarified that de-indexing and masking do not undermine the principle of open justice. The Bench observed: “The relief of de-indexing, properly understood, is therefore not an interference with open justice. As noticed, ‘open justice’ requires that judicial records exist, be maintained and be accessible to those with a legitimate interest.”
The Court additionally recognised that unrestricted digital accessibility of judicial records may disproportionately burden individuals long after legal proceedings have concluded, particularly in cases involving acquittals, settlements, matrimonial disputes, and quashed criminal proceedings.
The Bench therefore held that reliefs such as de-indexing and masking may appropriately be granted where continued public accessibility no longer serves any legitimate public interest and disproportionately infringes dignity, autonomy and informational privacy.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court held that the right to be forgotten forms part of informational privacy protected under Article 21 and directed de-indexing, delinking and masking reliefs in several petitions forming part of the batch.
The Court directed Google LLC, Google Inc., Google India Private Limited and other search engine operators to de-index the relevant content, judgments, orders and associated reportage from name-based search results in cases where relief had been granted.
The Court further directed Indian Kanoon to restrict name-based search functionality in respect of records relating to the concerned petitioners, while continuing to permit access through case number, citation, court details and date.
The Court additionally granted liberty to petitioners to seek masking before the courts that had originally rendered the concerned judgments and orders. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) was directed to ensure compliance by intermediary platforms and search engine operators and to file a compliance affidavit before the Court.
The petitions were accordingly disposed of.
Cause Title: Laksh Vir Singh Yadav v. Union of India & Connected Matters (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4891)
Appearances
Petitioners : Senior Advocates Akhil Sibal, Arvind Nigam and Trideep Pais; Advocates Rohit Madan, Rahul Kumar, Mamta R. Jha, Neha Rathi, Kajal Giri, Saloni Ambastha, Somya Kumari, Prateek Yadav and several other counsels appearing across connected matters.
Respondents : Senior Advocates Saurabh Seth and Ajit Warrier; CGSCs, SPCs and Standing Counsels appearing for Union of India, MEITY, Google LLC, Indian Kanoon, Registrar General Delhi High Court and other respondents.
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