A PDF Embed Here“On the face of it, it’s a terrible agreement for everyone except Iran,” said Sir John Jenkins, former British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq.
He also stressed Iran’s readiness to work with neighboring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to build a framework aimed at long-term stability, growth and prosperity.
This would not only revive intra-regional escalation but could (again) place targets on the backs of Gulf countries with strikes on infrastructural and civilian sites of interest.
“We are witnessing a historical shift in the regional dynamics, as outsourcing security to the US military actually translated into an intense security dilemma for the Arab monarchies,” he said.
“Real security for the Gulf requires including Iran and Iraq in a viable architecture driven by regional states.
LONDON: When President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, Barack Obama, who as his predecessor had forged the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, warned that doing so “without any Iranian violation of the deal is a serious mistake.”
The US, Obama added, “could eventually be left with a losing choice between a nuclear-armed Iran or another war in the Middle East.”
Eight years on, that predicted war, triggered by the surprise joint attack on Iran by the US and Israel on February 28, has now been fought and — temporarily, at least — halted.
But following the publication on Thursday of the 1,050-word memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran, analysts say the war has ended in a strategic defeat for the US that has left Iran, and its nuclear ambitions, in a far stronger position than before.
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“On the face of it, it’s a terrible agreement for everyone except Iran,” said Sir John Jenkins, former British ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq. “I also think there’s a dilemma for the GCC. If the US can’t be trusted to secure their national interests, who can?”
For Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, professor in global thought and comparative philosophies at the UK’s School of Oriental and African Studies and co-director of the Centre for Iranian Studies, the MoU is “a huge strategic defeat for both Trump and Netanyahu as they didn’t achieve any of their self-declared goals with this disastrous war.”
“Rather, Iran is now in the position to dictate what happens in Lebanon and Palestine with more leverage than ever before in recent history.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump are shown in a poster during a gathering of Iranian community members showing support for Israel and the US outside the Consulate General of Israel in Los Angeles, on March 5, 2026, just days after they launched airstrikes against Iran. (AFP/File Photo)
Furthermore, “there is also a growing realization in the US that supporting Israel’s war crimes comes with a heavy political and economic price.”
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which endured indiscriminate and unprovoked attacks by Iran during the conflict, have expressed diplomatic support for the agreement, which, if it is adhered to by all parties for the next 60 days, at least secures immediate relief from bombardment.
The Saudi Council of Ministers “expressed hope that peace would be achieved in a manner that enhances regional and global security while taking into account the security interests of countries in the region and respecting their internal affairs.”
There was a similar message from the UAE’s foreign ministry, which stressed “the importance of dialogue, diplomacy and adherence to international law.”
Writing for Arab News this week, Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Ali Reza Enayati, argued that the conflict had exposed the limitations of the region’s traditional security architecture and should serve as a catalyst for a new order based on cooperation, economic integration and shared responsibility among regional states.
Enayati outlined a vision built around four principles: a nonpolar regional system in which security is managed collectively by regional countries rather than external powers; a greater emphasis on political solutions to conflicts and the lifting of sanctions; deeper economic cooperation and trade; and recognition that security and development are indivisible across the region.
He also stressed Iran’s readiness to work with neighboring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to build a framework aimed at long-term stability, growth and prosperity.
But while the MoU makes no provision for Tehran to compensate the Gulf states for the extensive damage they have suffered under Iranian bombardment, the US “undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
Additionally, the US Treasury Department will issue waivers to allow the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and the US “undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
On Monday, three days before the wording of the MoU was revealed, a joint statement by the E4 — France, Germany, Italy and the UK, joined by 30 other countries — welcomed the “diplomatic breakthrough” as “a moment of opportunity to restore regional stability and stabilize the global economy.”
Yet every one of six analysts approached by Arab News agreed that, in the words of Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute specializing in US foreign policy and national security, the MoU represents only “an expensive return to the prewar status quo, with the additional costs of greater skepticism and uncertainty among US regional partners about America’s overall strategic reliability.”
Trump, said Christian Emery, an associate professor in international politics at University College London, “has achieved none of his aims for the war.”
“A regime that seemed to be teetering under the weight of domestic protest now has renewed confidence that it can withstand the most powerful military in the world and use its own hard power and geography to reshape the region to its advantage.”
This photograph taken during a tour for foreign media shows media representatives walking past the parked buses that were burnt at a depot during recent public protests, in Tehran on January 21, 2026. (AFP/File photo)
Before the war, he said, both the US and Israel insisted that “any deal on the nuclear issue must see Iran end its support for regional proxies and accept major limits on its ballistic missile capabilities.”
But “those two demands have now disappeared from the memorandum of understanding, and Washington has stopped trying to link them to the final agreement.”
For Ibrahim Al-Marashi, professor of Middle East history at California State University San Marcos, the MoU represents “an absolute costly return to the prewar status that not only leaves core tensions unresolved, it is the outcome of what essentially became a Gulf civil war as a result of the US intervention. And that Gulf civil war will take years, if not decades, to resolve.”
“The only thing that was achieved was the demonstration of Iran’s ability to bring the greatest war machine to a standstill by destabilizing its immediate environment.”
Under the terms of the MoU, the US has also agreed to remove its naval blockade of Iran and to withdraw all its forces “from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran” within 30 days after the final deal is struck.
Iran’s only commitment, meanwhile, is to allow shipping to return to the prewar status quo of free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, with no charge — but only for 60 days.
The MoU states that “the traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start,” but then adds that “considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days.”
What might happen after 60 days is anyone’s guess. The MoU provides only that Iran “will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states” — states that might reasonably wonder why Iran is now being given any say at all over the legal free passage of vessels through the strait.
“If Iran is able to assert its illegal claim to control the strait, then it’s a money-spinner and a threat of future closure at any time,” Sir John said. “I don’t see how the GCC can live with this.”
The war, said Caroline Rose, a senior director at the Soufan Center specializing in security and defense in the Middle East and North Africa, “has shown the geopolitical fragility of the Strait of Hormuz.”
“I don’t think we will see the prewar levels of maritime traffic through the strait again, as shipping companies and countries are now in a race to diversify and identify alternative routes.”
But for many, the most astonishing part of the MoU relates to Iran’s nuclear program.
A handout picture provided by the Iranian presidential office on April 10, 2021, shows a grab of a videoconference screen of an engineer inside Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment plant, shown during a ceremony headed by the country's president on Iran's National Nuclear Technology Day, in the capital Tehran. (AFP/File photo)
When Trump unilaterally withdrew the US from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018, and reimposed the sanctions it had removed, he declared it to be “a horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made.”
But now the MoU obliges the US to “terminate all types of sanctions” against Iran, which in turn “reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons” — exactly the position the two countries were in under the terms of the JCPOA before it was scrapped by Trump.
In June 2025, following the Operation Midnight Hammer attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth praised Trump for “decimating — choose your word — obliterating, destroying, Iran’s nuclear capabilities.”
Now, however, the MoU tacitly acknowledges that Iran’s nuclear program and stockpile of enriched uranium had not in fact been eliminated.
Point 8 states that the US and Iran have agreed “to resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material” and “to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear needs.”
Pending the final deal, Iran “will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions and will not deploy additional forces in the region.”
This handout satellite image provided by Maxar Technologies and dated July 1, 2025, shows activity near the perimeter building and southern holes caused by the June 22 US airstrike on the Fordo (Fordow) Fuel Enrichment Plant complex, about 30 kilometres north of Qom in central Iran. (AFP/File photo)
What is clear from the MoU, said Emery, is that “all Trump really cares about at this stage is restoring freedom of navigation in the Gulf and getting markets to react accordingly.”
“On the nuclear issue, the minimum he needs is for Iran not to be seen as developing a nuclear weapon and for there to be the appearance of a process that will eventually determine the fate of Iran’s enriched nuclear material.”
The MoU commits the US and Iran to “negotiating and achieving the final deal” in a maximum of 60 days. That, said Al-Marashi, is a wholly unrealistic timeframe.
“Time is on Iran’s side,” he said. “Iran has found a way to weaponize time. Procrastination over the next 60 days is a strategic goal of Iran.”
Tehran, Emery said, “is under little pressure to agree to major concessions for the sake of a quick deal. They have never felt compelled to do so before, and they now believe the US has much less leverage, having already played its ultimate coercive card: military force.”
“Iran may be tempted to wait and see whether Trump emerges further weakened by November’s midterm elections before making any major concessions of its own.”
The MoU contains a provision allowing the talks to be extended by mutual consent and, Emery said, “it seems inevitable that this will be necessary.”
“The 60-day window is simply too short to negotiate a technically complex agreement covering enrichment limits, inspections, sanctions relief, dispute resolution, procurement, implementation schedules, and verification mechanisms.
“Even the initial process of verifying how much enriched uranium Iran possesses poses a far greater technical challenge than it did in the lead-up to the JCPOA.”
For Rose, the 60-day timeframe to seal a final deal “is a direct reflection of how fast the Trump administration wants to close the book on this conflict ahead of midterms and dodge congressional application of the War Powers Act.”
“The Iranian regime will likely wait this process out and resist giving up major pieces of leverage.”
Official Israeli silence over the terms of the MoU speaks volumes.
As an ally of the US, the document commits Israel to “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon,” and to not initiating “any war or any military operation” and “ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon.”
The final deal, it adds, “will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon.”
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In Israel, commentators have greeted the deal as “a catastrophic capitulation” to Iran, which leaves Israel “vulnerable and constrained.”
For the Gulf states, Rose added: “The real spoiler after the 60-day period would be a potential Israeli campaign against Iran. This would not only revive intra-regional escalation but could (again) place targets on the backs of Gulf countries with strikes on infrastructural and civilian sites of interest.
“Gulf states will want to avoid this scenario entirely and secure assurances from Tel Aviv that there will be no continuation of escalation after the US and Iran secure a deal.”
In addition to causing global economic harm and significant loss of life, the war, Brian Katulis said, “has also resulted in a reordering of a fragile balance of power in the Middle East, and the region remains in disequilibrium.”
Among the issues that the MoU fails to address directly is Iran’s use of regional proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.
Supporters of the Iran-backed Houthi movement, brandish their weapons as they rally in solidarity with Iran and Lebanon, in Sanaa on April 8, 2026, following the announcement of a ceasefire in the Middle East war. (AFP)
“Because this deal does not address many core issues that led to the conflict and because the Trump administration has such a poor track record in producing lasting diplomatic outcomes on the global stage, it seems inevitable that some return to conflict will take place,” Katulis said.
Not entirely inevitable, Adib-Moghaddam believes.
“We are witnessing a historical shift in the regional dynamics, as outsourcing security to the US military actually translated into an intense security dilemma for the Arab monarchies,” he said.
“Real security for the Gulf requires including Iran and Iraq in a viable architecture driven by regional states.
“This is the only option left after this war, and the sooner this reality (is embraced), the sooner the peoples of the region can live their lives without the brutality of these ongoing conflicts.”
