Mengal, however, survived and was later escorted to safety by the Pakistan military — the same military that says it is fighting ISK and sectarian terrorism.
They occupy towns for a few hours, demolish symbols of the Pakistani state, and are hailed as liberators by a local populace that feels largely alienated from the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani state.
Security forces, including the Pakistan Army, are reported to have confined themselves to their bunkers.
If anything, both the BLA and the Afghan Taliban accuse the Pakistan Army of using ISK against them.
But on the ground, it is clear that Rawalpindi, where the Pakistan Army is headquartered, is losing.
Image Source: Getty Images
Key Highlights Balochistan has slipped from Pakistan's control — a pincer of Baloch and TTP attacks, converging on Quetta, has exposed a state that can no longer secure its own highways or its own soldiers.
Rawalpindi is losing on every internal front: Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Afghan border, and now PoJK — all boiling over at once, with the regime's only real tool being brute force.
Pakistan's internal crises may heighten the risk of military adventurism. Confrontation with India could become an attractive option for a military seeking to deflect attention from mounting domestic challenges.
A sudden spike in insurgent attacks in the restive province of Balochistan has forced Pakistan's military-dominated hybrid regime to confront the gap between its middle-power ambitions and ground realities. It began with the suicide bombing of a coast guard camp in Jiwani by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), killing over 20 soldiers. The Pakistani media either did not report the story or downplayed it as an insignificant incident. A few days later, on the night of 4-5 July, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) launched an attack in the tourist area of Hanna Urak near Quetta cantonment. The target was reportedly former Afghan army soldiers who were allegedly being groomed for use against the Afghan Taliban. The next day, TTP militants struck a police camp in Ziarat district, killing over 20 policemen, many of them after being kidnapped. Before these attacks could even be processed, on 8 July, Baloch rebels killed more than a dozen Pakistan Army soldiers in an IED blast in Bela, eastern Balochistan. Around the same time, in another attack in Khuzdar, BLA fighters struck the home base of Shafiq Mengal, a notorious death squad leader who is a member of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and is also alleged to have links with Islamic State Khorasan (ISK). The Baloch rebels claim that nearly three dozen of Mengal's men were killed. Mengal, however, survived and was later escorted to safety by the Pakistan military — the same military that says it is fighting ISK and sectarian terrorism. Adding to the pressure, the Baloch fighters attacked Chaghi town a day later and occupied it for several hours, setting fire to police stations, banks, and other symbols of state authority.
Balochistan is no stranger to violence. Since around 2001, it has been in the throes of the fifth uprising against Pakistan. But there is now a growing sense that the insurgents have become so powerful and popular that the state has virtually ceased to exist in large parts of the province. The Baloch separatists have demonstrated not only their ferocity and commitment but also their reach across all parts of the province. They occupy towns for a few hours, demolish symbols of the Pakistani state, and are hailed as liberators by a local populace that feels largely alienated from the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani state. Highways are now effectively under the sway of the militants, who set up checkpoints at will and assert control over these routes. This alone has undercut the Pakistan Army's carefully constructed narrative that the country is poised to become a regional connectivity hub. If even highways and railways are not safe, and economic targets like mines and industries are under attack, who would see Pakistan as a viable option for investment and transit trade?
The situation is so bad that even ministers are rumoured to be paying protection money to insurgents. In any case, they are too scared to travel on state and national highways. Security forces, including the Pakistan Army, are reported to have confined themselves to their bunkers. In several cases — the recent attacks in Hanna Urak and Ziarat being examples — they failed to provide relief and reinforcement to security personnel under attack, raising questions about whether this reflects cowardice or complicity. As is often the case in Pakistan, a theory has gained currency suggesting that the Pakistan Army's commercial interests in mining and real estate may be a factor behind its inaction, with growing insecurity making it easier to acquire land and displace local populations. An alternate theory holds that the Pakistan Army has deliberately allowed the situation to deteriorate in order to manufacture a casus belli for a large-scale military operation against the Baloch.
As is often the case in Pakistan, a theory has gained currency suggesting that the Pakistan Army's commercial interests in mining and real estate may be a factor behind its inaction, with growing insecurity making it easier to acquire land and displace local populations. An alternate theory holds that the Pakistan Army has deliberately allowed the situation to deteriorate in order to manufacture a casus belli for a large-scale military operation against the Baloch.
Even so, what seems to have caused considerable panic in the Pakistan Army — read Pakistani state, since the civilian government functions largely as an embellishment to maintain the veneer of democracy — is the fact that in Balochistan it is caught in a kind of pincer attack. The Baloch freedom fighters, spearheaded by the BLA, are attacking in the Baloch-dominated regions of South, Central, and Eastern Balochistan, and have even struck the capital city, Quetta. Meanwhile, the Pashtun-dominated Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) insurgents are attacking in the Pashtun areas of North Balochistan and have registered their presence on the outskirts of Quetta. Islamabad has tried to spin the story and extract diplomatic gains by projecting the BLA as an associate or collaborator of the TTP, seeking to have it designated a terrorist organisation by the United Nations. However, a sustained media campaign questioning the UN's refusal to include the BLA under UNSC Resolution 1267 has fallen flat, as there is no credible evidence to validate Pakistani allegations.
While the BLA and TTP have a common enemy in the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani state, they are not fighting for a common cause. Ideologically, ethnically, and politically, there is nothing in common between the two organisations. Pakistan has arguably undermined its own case by also linking ISK with these two groups, even though both have carried out operations against ISK camps in Balochistan. If anything, both the BLA and the Afghan Taliban accuse the Pakistan Army of using ISK against them. The Pakistani military appears to believe that claims undercounting security force casualties and exaggerating insurgent losses will convince everyone that the state is winning. But on the ground, it is clear that Rawalpindi, where the Pakistan Army is headquartered, is losing. Despite widespread and rampant human rights abuses — high-handed tactics, enforced disappearances, kill-and-dump policies carried out by state-mandated death squads led by figures like Shafiq Mengal, scorched-earth operations in which villages are raided, collective punishment meted out to civilians, and kangaroo courts used to convict political activists — the Pakistani state has been unable to control the situation. When all else fails, Islamabad's default tactic is to attribute the unrest to India. The Baloch rebels are labelled Fitna-al-Hindustan. But these disingenuous labels have convinced few beyond a narrow domestic constituency within Pakistan.
For Pakistan, the flare-up in Balochistan could not have come at a worse time. The security situation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province is extremely delicate, with daily attacks, ambushes, and target killings becoming the norm. The situation has become even more fraught amid rising tensions with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan, followed by Afghan drone strikes on Pakistan, have hardened positions in both countries, and the entire western border with Afghanistan is now unsettled. Pakistani strikes inside Afghanistan have not proven effective in deterring TTP insurgents, most of whom are now operating from inside Pakistan. As if the deteriorating security situation west of the Indus River were not enough, there is also mounting unrest in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), where people are demanding basic civic, political, and economic rights, and are angered at being labelled terrorists by Pakistani occupying forces.
The fact that all this is happening at a time when the regime is deeply unpopular and enjoys little political legitimacy, and has only one tool in its arsenal to restore order — brute force — is not helping matters. What is worse, the economy remains in the doldrums and offers no succour to the people. On top of all this, the imminent collapse of the tenuous ceasefire in the US-Iran war raises the prospect of Pakistan being dragged into a wider conflict. The economic, social, and military consequences of fighting in the Middle East could be devastating, potentially unravelling a state already fighting one battle after another internally. But instead of putting its house in order, the Pakistan Army has fallen back on its default option — blaming it on India. In recent weeks, Pakistani commentators have conjured up a new India-Israel-Taliban axis said to be working overtime to undermine Pakistan in Balochistan. The evidence for this? An Israeli think tank, MEMRI, has hired a Baloch researcher and started a Balochistan studies project.
Past experience suggests there is a certain rationality to Pakistan's apparent irrationality, and Indian policymakers would do well to factor this into their threat calculus.
There is, therefore, a real possibility of a beleaguered military establishment resorting to military adventurism to ease domestic pressure. Nothing rallies the troops and the public quite like a war with the "eternal" enemy. The Pakistan military's spokesman indicated as much when he said that no one should expect any “rationality or proportionality” in Pakistan's response to the rise in militant violence. The "proportionality" reference is aimed at the insurgents and signals the Pakistan Army's intent to respond with overwhelming force — fighters, drones, gunships, tanks, artillery, and death squads — to decimate any resistance to Pakistani rule. The "rationality" reference was aimed at India, since many Indian analysts have mistakenly convinced themselves that a Pakistan on the ropes cannot afford to open another front against India, especially when it is already engaged in an undeclared war with Afghanistan. But past experience suggests there is a certain rationality to Pakistan's apparent irrationality, and Indian policymakers would do well to factor this into their threat calculus.
Pakistan is likely to view itself as caught in a deep mess, with the only way forward being to fight its way out of the quagmire. Domestically, this means a steamroller operation. That such operations have not worked in the past is unlikely to dissuade Field Marshal Asim Munir and the circle of loyalists surrounding him. Externally, this could mean initiating a hot conflict with India. The military is coming under considerable pressure to act against India, which is being accused of stoking unrest in Pakistan. Critics of the Pakistan Army have mocked the generals, arguing that the establishment is quick to bomb Afghanistan — knowing Afghanistan lacks the capability to retaliate — but hesitates before India, which can hit back. There are calls to strike at the fount of troubles — India — rather than attacking India's alleged proxies. Under pressure to act, Pakistani generals may calculate that a shooting match with India would not last more than a few days — an outcome that suits Pakistan, but perhaps also suits India, given that the latter (a “shiny Mercedes” by Pakistan's own admission) has far more to lose than the "dumper truck" that is Pakistan.
Under pressure to act, Pakistani generals may calculate that a shooting match with India would not last more than a few days — an outcome that suits Pakistan, but perhaps also suits India, given that the latter (a “shiny Mercedes” by Pakistan's own admission) has far more to lose than the "dumper truck" that is Pakistan.
Having internalised the narrative that Pakistan worsted India during Operation Sindoor, Pakistanis have convinced themselves that they could actually prevail in a short, sharp war against India. They believe India is diplomatically isolated — seemingly overlooking that it was India, not Pakistan, that was invited to the G7 meeting in France. They are convinced they have built enough goodwill in the Arab and Islamic world (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and others), as well as in the West, to secure international backing in any conflict with India. Pakistan also considers itself close to Donald Trump, whom Islamabad has courted through gestures such as nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize, and Pakistanis believe he would come to their defence and pressure India to back off. Pakistan would then expect Trump to push India into restoring the Indus Waters Treaty and to bring India to the negotiating table, with the United States playing mediator and guarantor — a role Trump has long sought to play.
Given that the Indian government maintains that Operation Sindoor has only been paused, it follows that India remains "locked and loaded" and is well placed to give an immediate riposte to any Pakistani misadventure.
With Pakistani generals accustomed to operating in an alternate reality, there is considerable chatter about retaliating against India for what Pakistanis allege — without any evidence — is Indian support for Baloch, Pashtun, and now even Kashmiri opposition to the Punjabi-dominated military and bureaucratic establishment. India must therefore be prepared for a sudden Pakistani attack. Not only must India make it clear that it will rain fire and fury on Pakistan, but it must also have a target list ready to retaliate within hours of any Pakistani misadventure. Given that the Indian government maintains that Operation Sindoor has only been paused, it follows that India remains "locked and loaded" and is well placed to give an immediate riposte to any Pakistani misadventure.
Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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