The 40-day Iran War — Operation Epic Fury — is proving no different.
The US military conducted its first combat use of the LUCAS on February 28, the first day of the Iran War.
The LUCAS drone’s success in the Iran War means that the US military will use it in future conflicts as well.
To address this shortcoming, the US began work on the GBU-57 MOP successor as soon as the war in June 2025 ended.
Another learning of the Iran War has been the high loss ratio of the MQ-9 Reaper drones.
Every major war in history has been a brutal yet effective teacher for the world’s militaries. Conflicts expose weaknesses, shatter assumptions, and compel radical change in military tactics and weapons systems.
The 40-day Iran War — Operation Epic Fury — is proving no different.
While the war is still not over and hostilities can start again any day, the war is already forcing radical changes in the US military tactics, priorities, and its plans for future weapons systems.
In his first House Armed Services Committee appearance since the Iran war began, Adm. Brad Cooper said the US military has changed even in the past eight weeks, as highlighted by its reliance on Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System (LUCAS), which was used extensively in the Iran War.
Adm. Cooper described the LUCAS drone, a US reverse-engineered version of the Iranian Shahed-136 drone, as a “game-changer.”
“Lucas, indispensable. As many of you know… this was an original Iranian drone design. We captured it, pulled the guts out, sent it back to America, put a little ‘Made in America’ on it, brought it back here, and we’re shooting it at the Iranians,” Adm. Cooper said.
Earlier in a March press conference, Adm. Cooper highlighted how LUCAS helped the US “flip the cost curve,” using cheap US one-way attack drones to force Iran to expend expensive air defenses.
The US military conducted its first combat use of the LUCAS on February 28, the first day of the Iran War.
The kamikaze drones were deployed by Task Force Scorpion Strike during Operation Epic Fury to strike key military targets in Iran.
The LUCAS drone’s success in the Iran War means that the US military will use it in future conflicts as well.
Furthermore, when Rep. John McGuire asked Adm. Cooper what additional support was needed, the four-star admiral outlined what he believed should be the three top priorities for the U.S. military going forward.
“I’d put three things: more electronic warfare, keep counter-UAS on the leading edge—tactics change very quickly—and we need to invest more in hard and deeply buried targets,” Cooper said. “Everybody is going underground.”
He noted that Iran and its proxies — such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis — are increasingly relying on underground facilities, tunnels, and hardened bunkers. Though Adm. Cooper did not state it explicitly, these deeply buried and fortified sites are the primary reason the United States has struggled to fully achieve its war objectives against Iran.
U.S. Vs Iran’s Underground Bunkers
In June 2025, the US launched its first air strikes on Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers flew non-stop from the US to Iran and dropped 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), also known as bunker buster bombs, on two Iranian nuclear sites – Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant and Natanz Nuclear Facility.
Notably, though GBU-57 MOP bombs were developed in the 2010s, this was the first combat use of these 30,000-pound bunker buster bombs that can penetrate 200 feet (60 meters) before exploding.
In fact, when the US bombed Iranian nuclear sites, Israel had been pounding Iran already for 11 days. However, Israel knew that it did not have any missiles or ammunition capable of penetrating 200 feet of rock or hard concrete to destroy Iran’s deeply-buried nuclear sites.
However, following the US air strikes, a classified preliminary US intelligence report concluded that American strikes on Iran set back Tehran’s nuclear program by just a few months, rather than destroying it.
The aerial bombardments and missile strikes sealed off entrances to some facilities without destroying underground buildings, according to the report.
The failure of US air strikes in June 2025 to destroy Iran’s enriched Uranium stockpile necessitated a second campaign by the US and Israel, which commenced in February and March this year.
However, once again, the US faced similar limitations. None of the US missiles or ammunition was capable of penetrating over 300 feet of hard rock; hence, the only way the US could have destroyed or captured the Iranian enriched Uranium stockpile was through a high-risk ground operation.
To address this shortcoming, the US began work on the GBU-57 MOP successor as soon as the war in June 2025 ended.
In September 2025, the US Air Force Life Cycle Management Center’s (AFLCMC) Munitions Directorate at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida awarded a two-year contract to Applied Research Associates (ARA) for designing and prototyping the successor of the enormous MOP bunker-busting bomb.
ARA will “serve as the System Design Agent for the development of a prototype air-to-ground Next Generation Penetrator weapon system,” said a company press release. “ARA will also produce and test sub-scale and full-scale prototype munitions. This effort will evaluate capabilities against hard and deeply buried targets that pose critical challenges to US national security.”
ARA will develop the next bunker-buster bomb in close collaboration with Boeing, the prime contractor for the GBU-57 MOP.
Notably, the idea for the GBU-57 MOP itself came from lessons learned from the Iraq War. Though the bomb was developed as part of the “Big BLU” program that was initiated in 2002, its development intensified after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which revealed flaws in the existing weapons against targets that were deeply buried underground. The GBU-57 MOP went into service in 2011.
However, it had to wait a full 14 years before its first combat use in Iran in June 2025.
Similarly, the failure of the GBU-57 MOP to fully oblitrate the Iranian nuclear program is fueling work on its successor, the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP) weapon system.
Another learning of the Iran War has been the high loss ratio of the MQ-9 Reaper drones.
In the 40-day war, the US Air Force lost as many as 24 MQ-9 Reaper drones.
Earlier, during the Yemen campaign, the USAF lost seven MQ-9 Reaper drones. These losses underscore how the MQ-9 Reapers have become highly vulnerable in contested airspace.
The Reapers operate at low subsonic speeds of 300 miles per hour or less, have a large radar signature, and follow a predictable flight profile, making them highly vulnerable.
However, compared to one-way attack drones such as the LUCAS or Shahed-136, MQ-9 Reapers are many times more costly, making their loss a significant financial blow to the US military.
The US Air Force, therefore, wants a new drone to replace its expensive workhorse, the MQ-9 Reaper, one that is cheap enough to risk losing in battle.
Earlier this month, the US Air Force confirmed that it has finalized a new set of requirements for the successor to the MQ-9 Reaper fleet.
The replacement UAV must have greater flexibility in its mission spectrum and leverage new production technologies to enable rapid, large-scale production at a lower price point than the MQ-9. The lower price point will allow the USAF to procure this UAV in large numbers and to risk them more freely in battle zones.
