26th SCO Summit 2026

This editorial is based on “Message from Bishkek” published in the Business Standard on 02/09/2026. The article highlights that the SCO summit underscored the growing assertion of China as a powerful competing sphere of influence, presenting India with complex diplomatic challenges as it balances regional Eurasian engagement against broader global alignments.

The 26th SCO Summit in Bishkek marked the organisation’s 25th anniversary, adopting the Bishkek Declaration and passing documents on counter-terrorism and connectivity before transferring the presidency to Pakistan. For India, the summit highlighted the contradictions and utility of engaging a Eurasian bloc that includes China, Russia, Pakistan, and Iran while balancing strong ties with Western and partner nations. The organisation remains a vital platform providing India strategic access to Central Asia despite ongoing geopolitical challenges.

What is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation?

About: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a permanent Eurasian intergovernmental organisation established to promote regional security, political cooperation, economic engagement and cultural exchanges. It has emerged as an important platform connecting Central Asia, South Asia, China and Russia .

Origin and Evolution: The SCO originated from the “Shanghai Five” , formed in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to resolve border disputes and build military confidence. Following Uzbekistan’s inclusion, the SCO was formally established on 15 th June 2001 in Shanghai . The SCO Charter , signed in 2002, came into force in 2003. India and Pakistan became full members in 2017 , Iran in 2023 , and Belarus in 2024 .

Membership: SCO consists of 10 full members—China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and Belarus. India and Pakistan became full members in 2017 , Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024 . (Turkmenistan is not a member of SCO) According to the SCO Secretariat, these member states collectively account for over 3.4 billion people and around 36 million square kilometres. Additionally, they represent approximately one-fourth of global GDP and over 15% of international trade.

Major Objectives:

Institutional Structure: Council of Heads of State: The highest decision-making body. Council of Heads of Government: Deals primarily with economic and developmental cooperation. Council of Foreign Ministers: Coordinates external and political matters. SCO Secretariat: Located in Beijing, China . Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS): Located in Tashkent, Uzbekistan , it coordinates action against terrorism, separatism and extremism.

India and the SCO: India became an observer in 2005 and a full member in 2017 . India hosted the SCO summit virtually in 2023 , when the New Delhi Declaration was adopted. However, India opposes connectivity projects that violate sovereignty, particularly the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through Pakistan-occupied Jammu&Kashmir.

What are the Key Outcomes of the 26th SCO Summit, 2026?

Adoption of the Bishkek Declaration: SCO members adopted the Bishkek Declaration as the summit’s principal political document. Altogether, leaders approved 28 outcome documents covering security, economic cooperation, institutional reform, energy, climate and cultural exchanges.

Stronger Counter-Terrorism Consensus: The Declaration condemned terrorism in all its forms, rejected “double standards” , and called for action against the cross-border movement of terrorists and the misuse of terrorist, separatist and extremist organisations for political objectives. This supported India’s demand to dismantle the entire terror ecosystem— financing, recruitment, radicalisation, safe havens and state support .

New Regional Security Architecture: Regulations were approved for an SCO Universal Centre for Countering Challenges and Threats and the Executive Committee of the SCO Anti-Drug Centre . Cooperation was also proposed against organised crime, synthetic drugs, narcotics precursors and information-security threats.

English Recognised as an Official Language: Through amendments to the SCO Charter , English was included as an official and working language , alongside Russian and Chinese. India had strongly supported this reform, which can widen the participation of officials, researchers, businesses and civil-society institutions.

Disaster-Response Cooperation: A separate statement was adopted on assistance to states affected by emergencies , encouraging coordinated disaster relief, information exchange and capacity-building. This is particularly relevant to an SCO region vulnerable to earthquakes, floods, glacial hazards and extreme weather.

Institutional and Global Outreach: The summit approved an MoU between the SCO Secretariat and the African Union Commission. It also highlighted the SCO– CSTO – CIS Roadmap and the SCO-Plus format , strengthening engagement with Africa, Eurasian organisations and the United Nations.

Youth and Civilisational Engagement: Members supported the regular organisation of the SCO Young Scientists Forum , youth cooperation and the Young Authors Conference. India will host the first SCO Civilisation Dialogue Forum later in 2026, expanding India’s cultural and knowledge diplomacy.

Sovereignty-Based Connectivity: Members supported improved transport corridors, customs simplification, digital documentation and efficient logistics. Significantly for India, connectivity was linked with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states—reinforcing India’s objections to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Transfer of Presidency: Kyrgyzstan transferred the 2026–27 SCO presidency to Pakistan , whose announced theme is “ Turning Vision into Action: Connectivity, Innovation and Shared Prosperity. ” Pakistan will host the next Council of Heads of State meeting in 2027, while Lahore was designated the SCO Tourism and Cultural Capital for 2026–27 .

What is the Significance of the SCO for India?

Institutionalising Counter-Terror Diplomacy: The SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent provides India with a permanent Eurasian mechanism for intelligence exchange and coordination against the “three evils”—terrorism, separatism and extremism . India uses SCO forums to advocate zero tolerance, no double standards , and action against terror financing, radicalisation, recruitment networks and safe havens. This converts terrorism from a bilateral India–Pakistan dispute into a question of collective regional accountability.

Disrupting the Narco-Terror–Organised Crime Nexus: SCO security cooperation helps India address the interconnected threats of narcotics trafficking, illegal arms, cybercrime and terrorist financing . Drugs originating from the Afghanistan–Pakistan region can finance terrorist and organised-crime networks, making coordinated border control and financial intelligence crucial for India. A coordinated Eurasian response can disrupt the entire criminal chain—from drug production and transit to money laundering and terrorism.

Overcoming India’s Continental Disconnect: The SCO provides sustained institutional access to the Central Asian republics despite India’s lack of direct land connectivity. It complements the Connect Central Asia Policy 2012 and the India–Central Asia Dialogue , enabling cooperation in defence training, healthcare, education, pharmaceuticals and capacity-building. Thus, the SCO gives India diplomatic access to a strategically important region where geography otherwise limits its physical presence.

Strengthening Resource and Energy Security: SCO members constitute a major Eurasian resource arc , possessing substantial reserves of oil, natural gas, uranium and critical minerals. Engagement with Russia and Iran for hydrocarbons and Kazakhstan for uranium enables India to pursue supplier diversification , long-term contracts and strategic supply-chain resilience . It can reduce India’s vulnerability to maritime chokepoints , geopolitical sanctions and supply disruptions.

Operationalising Multi-Alignment: The SCO enables India to engage Russia, China, Iran and Central Asia while simultaneously strengthening partnerships with the US, Europe and the Quad . It reinforces India’s doctrine of strategic autonomy and issue-based alignment , allowing participation in overlapping institutions without joining exclusive geopolitical blocs.

Maintaining Crisis-Communication Channels: As one of the few platforms containing India, China and Pakistan, the SCO provides space for structured engagement, diplomatic signalling and conflict management during bilateral tensions. Even when disputes remain unresolved, sustained institutional contact helps prevent diplomatic isolation and uncontrolled escalation. India can also highlight the contradiction between Pakistan’s SCO counterterrorism commitments and its alleged support for cross-border terrorism—creating multilateral reputational pressure .

Building a Pakistan-Bypassing Connectivity Architecture: The SCO can support India’s access to Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia and Europe through multimodal, sovereignty-respecting corridors . The Chabahar Port – International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) network provides an alternative to Pakistan-controlled transit routes. Such connectivity can transform India from a maritime South Asian power into an active continental Eurasian stakeholder.

Converting Civilisational Capital into Soft Power: India uses the SCO to project Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, Yoga , Ayurveda , Buddhism , startups and scientific cooperation , presenting itself as a provider of regional public goods. The SCO Young Authors’ Conference, Young Scientists Forum and proposed SCO Civilisation Dialogue Forum help transform historical linkages into academic networks, cultural diplomacy and long-term strategic goodwill . This allows India to balance China’s infrastructure-led influence with a people-centric model built on knowledge, culture and capacity-building.

What are Key Challenges for India in Navigating SCO Relations?

China–Pakistan Axis and Consensus Capture: The growing “all-weather” strategic alignment between China and Pakistan often converts the SCO’s consensus-based functioning into a diplomatic constraint for India, particularly on terrorism, Kashmir and connectivity . Pakistan will hold the SCO presidency during 2026–27 and host the 2027 summit, creating additional diplomatic complexity for India. China’s continuing strategic and economic support to Pakistan further restricts the SCO’s ability to address India’s security concerns impartially.

Selective Counterterrorism and Narrative Politics: Despite its mandate against the “three evils” — terrorism, separatism and extremism , the SCO lacks a common definition of terrorism and avoids naming State sponsors. E.g., India rejected the 2025 Qingdao Defence Ministers’ communiqué because it omitted the Pahalgam terrorist attack while accommodating Pakistan-backed narratives, exposing double standards on terrorism .

Pakistan’s Transit Veto and Continental Disconnect: Pakistan’s denial of overland access leaves India logistically excluded from Afghanistan and Central Asia. Dependence on the longer Chabahar–INSTC corridor , whose operationalisation remains incomplete, creates a connectivity asymmetry vis-à-vis China’s extensive Eurasian railways, highways and pipelines.

China-Centric Institutional Architecture: China’s economic weight, infrastructure financing and geographical proximity generate agenda-setting dominance and make the SCO’s economic vision increasingly Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) -centric . India remains the only SCO member opposing the BRI because CPEC passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir , producing a fundamental connectivity–sovereignty contradiction .

Multi-Alignment Under Strategic Strain: India must reconcile its participation in the SCO and BRICS with expanding engagement through the Quad and Indo-Pacific partnerships . While China and Russia increasingly present the SCO as a counterweight to Western institutions, India views it as non-Western, but not anti-Western , creating persistent platform-balancing pressures .

Declaration–Delivery Deficit: Despite covering over 3.4 billion people, nearly 25% of global GDP and more than 15% of world trade , the SCO remains institutionally underdeveloped as an economic grouping. Projects such as an SCO Development Bank , common payment arrangements and integrated transport corridors have progressed slowly. India’s limited physical access and weak integration with Eurasian value chains prevent it from fully exploiting the organisation’s economic potential.

Afghanistan’s Security Spillover: Taliban-controlled Afghanistan constitutes a strategic vacuum at the heart of Eurasia, enabling terrorism, radicalisation, refugee flows, arms trafficking and the narcotics–terror finance nexus . Divergent approaches of India, Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran towards the Taliban obstruct a coherent SCO regional-security doctrine .

Authoritarian Security Norms and Digital-Sovereignty Risks: SCO cooperation on cybersecurity and extremism may normalise mass surveillance, information control and opaque cross-border data sharing . Differing standards on privacy, civil liberties and Internet governance create a security–values dilemma for democratic India and risks legitimising State overreach under broad security classifications.

What Measures India Can Adopt to Further Utilise the SCO?

Convert RATS From an Information Repository into an Enforcement Network: India should promote real-time intelligence fusion, terror-finance blacklisting, cryptocurrency tracing and joint forensic investigations under the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure. . The Bishkek Declaration, 2026 , rejecting “double standards” on terrorism, can support a compliance-based counterterrorism framework that measures action against financiers, recruiters and safe havens.

Build a Sovereignty-Respecting Eurasian Connectivity Architecture: India should seek SCO recognition of the Chabahar–INSTC corridor as a principal multimodal route connecting the Indian Ocean with Iran, Central Asia and Russia. Harmonised customs rules, digital cargo tracking and multimodal freight services would help overcome Pakistan’s denial of land access while offering a sovereignty-respecting alternative to the CPEC through PoK .

Adopt a ‘Central Asia Plus India’ Strategy: India should form issue-based coalitions with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, reducing the impact of India–China and India–Pakistan disagreements on SCO cooperation. Exercise KAZIND , ITEC scholarships , Indian generic medicines, telemedicine and defence training provide existing foundations for deeper engagement.

Project India as Eurasia’s Digital Public-Goods Partner: The SCO Startup Forum should evolve into an Innovation and Digital Commerce Corridor comprising regulatory sandboxes, interoperable incubators, a joint venture fund and an MSMEs marketplace. Exporting UPI-type payments, digital identity, consent-based data exchange and open-commerce architecture would provide an inclusive, interoperable and low-cost alternative to closed digital ecosystems.

Revive the SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group: India should revive the SCO–Afghanistan Contact Group around counterterrorism guarantees, humanitarian corridors, women’s rights, health security and livelihood restoration. India’s supply of food and medicines and its record of development assistance give it credibility to pursue people-centric engagement without prematurely legitimising the Taliban.

Convert Civilisational Affinity into Strategic Social Capital: India should institutionalise the SCO Civilisation Dialogue Forum, university consortium, Young Scientists Forum and Young Authors’ Conference as permanent Track-II and people-to-people mechanisms. Shared Buddhist heritage, Sufi traditions , Silk Route linkages , yoga and Ayurveda can strengthen goodwill. The inclusion of English as an official and working language in 2026 can widen Indian academic and business participation.

Conclusion

While the Bishkek Summit highlighted the SCO's geopolitical importance, it is not a cohesive anti-Western alliance due to members' differing interests. For India, the SCO is a complex, necessary platform to engage Eurasia and address regional issues. India must practice selective multilateralism—cooperating on shared interests while resisting China-centric bloc politics. Ultimately, India’s policy success depends on enhancing its security, Eurasian access, strategic autonomy, counter-terrorism efforts, and economic gains rather than mere summit diplomacy.

Drishti Mains Question: The SCO is better understood as a plural Eurasian platform than as a coherent anti-Western alliance. Analyse.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 1. When and where was the 26th SCO Summit held, and what was its theme?

The 26th SCO Summit was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, from 31st August to 1st September 2026, under the theme “25 Years of the SCO: Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity.” 2. What were the key outcomes of the 26th SCO Summit for India?

Key outcomes include adoption of the Bishkek Declaration rejecting double standards on terrorism, inclusion of English as an official language, and support for sovereignty-based connectivity, reinforcing India’s objections to CPEC. 3. Why does India oppose the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) within the SCO?

India objects to CPEC because it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), directly violating India's sovereignty and territorial integrity.